Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. Decided Today

     The Supreme Court issued its decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. today.  Here is the Court's opinion and here is a news report of the decision from the New York Times.  In a 5-4 decision along ideological lines, the Court ruled that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause for a judge to fail to remove himself from a case involving a person who had made enormous campaign contributions to him.

     Hugh Caperton, the President of Harmon Mining Company, sued the Massey Coal Company and its affiliates on the ground that Massey had unlawfully driven the Harmon Mining Company out of business through a campaign of fraud and misrepresentation.   A jury awarded Caperton $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages.  After the verdict was rendered Don Blankenship, the President of Massey Coal, spent over $3 million to elect Brett Benjamin to the West Virginia Supreme Court.  Blankenship made the maximum campaign contribution of $1,000 directly to Benjamin's campaign, and the balance of the $3 million was spent on advertising promoting Benjamin's candidacy.  This was more than three times the amount that Benjamin's campaign committee itself spent during the election.  Benjamin was elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court.  Massey Coal appealed the decision in Caperton's case to the West Virginia Supreme Court.  Caperton asked Justice Benjamin to recuse himself from the case, but Benjamin refused the request.  In West Virginia, as in many states, there is no other procedure from removing a supreme court justice from a case.  The West Virginia Supreme Court, by a vote of 3-2, then reversed the verdict against Massey Coal Company.  Justice Benjamin voted with the majority in favor of Massey Coal.  Caperton appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause for Benjamin to have remained on the bench and to have voted on the case.

     In an opinion issued earlier today, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Caperton.  The Court once again split along liberal/conservative lines, with the swing justice, Anthony Kennedy, providing the deciding vote, this time voting with the liberal justices (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg).  Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, wrote the principal dissenting opinion.

     As is so often the case, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court.  That happens in these controversial cases because, as the swing justice, the other four justices in the majority are hardly in a position to argue with him if he requests the opportunity to write the decision!  There was not any precedent directly on point, but there were some similar cases.  A few years ago the Court had cracked down on "Mayor's Courts" where fines that the judge imposed were paid directly to the city and sometimes were even paid directly to city employees in the form of bonuses.  In another line of cases the Court had ruled that the same judge could not preside at both a preliminary hearing in a criminal case (deciding whether there was sufficient evidence to bind over the defendant for trial) and at the criminal proceeding itself (deciding whether the defendant was guilty), because the judge might be influenced by the evidence he had heard in the earlier proceeding and biased in favor of sustaining his previous decision for the prosecution.  Finally, in another case the Court had ruled that a state supreme court justice should have disqualified himself because he was the plaintiff in another ongoing case with very similar facts, and his ruling in the case he was sitting on would have helped his own case.  Justice Kennedy found that the rule in those cases turned upon the question of whether the "average judge" in that position was likely to be neutral or whether the personal interest of the judge creates a serious risk of bias.  He found that Blankenship's huge contributions to Benjamin's political campaign while the case was pending would create a serious risk of bias in the average person, and therefore it violated the Due Process Clause for Benjamin to have failed to remove himself from the case.  Justice Kennedy concluded:

On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level.

     Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that although the size and timing of the contributions to Benjamin's campaign presented a problem, there is no clear rule to apply to give judges, lawyers, and litigants guidance in future cases.  He stated:

Today … the Court enlists the Due Process Clause to overturn a judge's failure to recuse because of a "probability of bias."  Unlike the established grounds for disqualification, a "probability of bias" cannot be defined in any limited way.  The Court's new "rule" provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required.

     Despite the finding of the majority that this was a "rare" situation, these kinds of issues arise all the time.  Judges are usually lawyers who have practiced in a particular locality for an extended period of time, and as attorneys they developed all kinds of relationships with other lawyers and leading persons in the community.  As candidates for office they solicit campaign contributions, but more importantly, even if they have no personal connection with a judge, interests in the community often take a great interest in judicial campaigns.  Here in Ohio we have seen unions, insurance companies, other corporations, and trial lawyers contribute huge sums to help elect or defeat particular judges.  It is conceivable that the Court's decision today will throw a monkey wrench into the system of electing judges.

     One more consideration.  The justices may have been influenced by their positions on the constitutionality of limits on campaign contributions.  If that is true, then this case may be an important harbinger of the Court's position on that question.  Until now Justice Kennedy has voted in opposition to those laws – in 2003 he dissented from the Court's decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission upholding the McCain-Feingold Act and in 2007 he joined the Court's opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission in which the Court for constitutional reasons narrowly construed a provision of that Act.  Until now Kennedy seemed to agree with the four conservative justices that campaign finance reform laws violate the First Amendment, and to disagree with liberal justices who believe that these laws are justified because of the dangers of corruption and the appearance of corruption that large contributions create.  It appeared that campaign finance reform was hanging by a thread.  Unless Justice Kennedy changed his mind about the dangers of large contributions, McCain-Feingold might well be declared unconstitutional.  In this case, though, Justice Kennedy ruled that when a judge is the beneficiary of huge campaign contributions he may be disqualified from sitting on a case involving the contributor because of the high probability of bias.  This case may signal a change of heart by Justice Kennedy on the larger question concerning the constitutionality of legislation seeking to reduce the influence of large contributors, but we shall see.

Tagged as: Benjamin, Blankenship, Caperton, First Amendment, kennedy, Massey Coal Co., Roberts