The 14th Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy begins in one hour! David Kappos, director of the USPTO will discuss the America Invents Act, the biggest patent law reform since 1836, during the keynote address at 12:45. Follow the whole event live on Twitter  #akronlawip

The most significant changes to U.S. patent law since the Patent Act of 1836 were enacted into law last October with the new “America Invents Act (AIA).” The impact of those changes affects all businesses – large and small – and overall American innovation and research commercialization.

David J. Kappos, the U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, will be the keynote speaker at the 14^th annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy on Monday, March 19 from 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. The symposium will be held at the John S. Knight Center in Akron and is co-sponsored by The University of Akron School of Law and Sughrue Mion PLLC law firm.

In addition, the program will also include a review of recent developments in patent, trademark, and copyright law, as well as a panel discussion on international IP, with speakers from China, Mexico, and France. Another panel will focus on IP and Internet, including a review of developments relating to domain name disputes.

Jeffrey M. Samuels, the David L. Brennan Professor of Law and director of Akron Law’s Center for Intellectual Property Law and Technology, said Kappos will discuss procedural changes patent holders can expect with respect to patent litigation and disputes.

“Undersecretary Kappos will address the new tools and initiatives the office is implementing to make navigating the patent system easier for practitioners,” Samuels said. “The office’s goal has been to develop policies and procedures to speed up the patent review process and reduce a significant patent application backlog. We encourage all IP attorneys, inventors, and other IP professionals to attend and learn first-hand how the new law will affect their practices.”

For registration information, call 330-972-6363, email manovac@uakron.edu or visit http://www.uakron.edu/law/ip/sughrue-registration.dot .

Unable to attend? Follow live on Twitter at http://twitter.com/AkronLaw .

Co-sponsor Sughrue Mion celebrates more than 50 years as an international intellectual property law firm specializing in patent, trademark, copyright, Internet, trade secret and unfair competition law. The sponsorship is in memory of founding partner Richard C. Sughrue.

The New York Times ran a story today claiming that because of the new patent reform law, patent lawyers are in high demand.  Read the article here.

To learn more about how you can specialize in patent law (or intellectual property in general), visit the University of Akron School of Law's Center for Intellectual Property & Technology.

The world lost a great technological leader yesterday with the passing of Steve Jobs.  A quick patent search lists Jobs as a co-inventor on a multitude of both utility and design patents, including some of the following:

A design patent for the iPhone:

A utility patent for a “highly portable media device” (thumb drive):

A graphical user interface and method of use in a multimedia player (i.e. the hierarchy of how music on your iPod is displayed):

A design patent for a mouse:

And even a design patent for a staircase:

Jobs was no stranger to IP litigation either.  With several lawsuits brought by and against Apple, parties frequently requested that Jobs be made available for depositions.  In addition, Jobs’ presentations and videos thereof were used (unsuccessfully) to show patent infringement.  In Apple Computer v. Podfitness, Apple sued a producer of individualized workout routines that could be downloaded to a user’s iPod for a variety of trademark , unfair competition, and false advertising violations for, amongst other things, featuring Jobs’ name in advertisements.

In fact, Jobs’ success with invention was used to tell the story of why patent reform was necessary. [here and here]

To learn more about the recently enacted patent reform law, join us at the University of Akron’s Center for Intellectual Property & Technology on Friday, October 14 for LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT: MAJOR CHANGES; MAJOR CHALLENGES.

Yesterday evening, after several years of failed legislative proposals to reform the Patent Act, the first major overhaul of the patent laws since 1952 took place.  The Senate passed H.R. 1249 (89-9), also known as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.  President Obama is expected to sign the bill shortly.  Below are some of the provisions of the reform.

• Moves the US from a first-to-invent priority rule system to a first-to-file priority system.
• Eliminates best mode as a basis for invalidity, cancellation, or unenforceability.
• Limits who can file false marking claims to the US government and those who have suffered a competitive injury as a result of false marking.
• Gives the PTO the authority to adjust fees.
• Creates a new post-grant review system.
• Ensures that the alleged infringer's failure to obtain the advice of counsel cannot be used as evidence of willful infringement.

On a related note, the Center for Intellectual Property Law & Technology at the University of Akron School of Law is hosting the 5th Annual IP Scholars Forum on Oct. 28th which will have IP scholars from across the country and across the world discussing patent reform.

Panel Discussion: The Supreme Court's Patent Docket

Moderator: Professor Robert C. Kahrl, Akron Law

Panelists:
Gary Hoffman, Dickstein Shapiro LLP
Alan J. Kasper, Sughrue Mion, PLLC
Wayne Watkins, The University of Akron
Harold C. Wegner, Foley & Lardner

This panel is looking at the 3 cases pending in the Supreme Court (i4i, Stanford, and Global Tech) followed by a presentation on how to get your case in the Supreme Court.

Microsoft v. i4i (Gary Hoffman)

The issue is the burden of proof.  Since early 1980s, the standard has been "clear and convincing."  The particular prior art involved in this case was a prior use and this prior art was not before the PTO.  Microsoft argues that the clear and convincing standard is not in § 282 and because the PTO never considered this prior art, a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate.  i4i argues that the clear and convincing standard should be maintained because it is a long-standing precedent and the effects on US commerce would be negative.  Many amicus briefs have been filed in support of both sides (and neither side).

Why did the Supreme Court take this case?  Is it the existence of "patent trolls?"

What's the impact on value of patents and innovation? Mr. Hoffman notes he doesn't believe that changing the standard will have any effect on juries deciding invalidity.  He also questions what the parties will do if the standard is lowered?  Submit more prior art?  Less prior art?

Stanford Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems (Wayne Watkins)

The Stanford employee assigned his future patent rights to Roche, but Stanford argues the invention belongs to it per the Bayh-Dole Act.   The Federal Circuit held the assignment to Roche was permissible.  The question the Supreme Court is answering is whether the Federal Circuit's ruling violates Bayh-Dole.

Mr. Watkins believes the Court took this case because of the conflict between the text of the statute and the intent and policy of the statute.

Global-Tech v. SEB (Alan Kasper)

The issue is whether the legal standard for the state of mind element of a claim for actively inducing infringement under § 271(b) is "deliberate indifference of a known risk" that an infringement may occur… or "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" to encourage an infringement as the Court taught in MGM v. Grokster (a copyright case).

Mr. Kasper compared the statutory language of 271(a), (b), and (c) and finds a lack of language suggesting a standard for intent.  He further pointed out that there is a wide-ranging spectrum for the intent standard (ranging from no showing of knowledge or intent to a specific knowledge of the patent to deliberate indifference).

How to Get into the Supreme Court (Harold Wegner)

Mr. Wegner is discussing how to get your case before the Supreme Court.  Two suggestions he had, were, first, you need a bad decision by the Federal Circuit.  Second, you need good amicus briefing on the cert question.  Mr. Wegner is particular impressed with Prof. John Duffy's and other law professors' influence in this regard.

IP Symposium: The Future of the Nation's Patent and Copyright Systems

Panelists:
The Honorable Paul R. Michel, former chief judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

The Honorable Marybeth Peters, former U.S. Register of Copyrights

Marybeth Peters

Register Peters started off her talk discussing the biggest challenges in her job as Register of Copyrights.  These included the following:

• Formalities being voluntary as a result of joining the Berne Convention.
• DMCA requires the Copyright Office to create exemptions to access controls.  These took a lot more time and effort than she expected.
• We're becoming a more digitized world and issues of territoriality are challenging.  The suggestions for compulsory licensing are not a good idea.
• Making the Copyright Office more digital and accessible.

Next, she discussed the challenges in the future for copyright law.  She commented that the challenges are:

• We have a digital networked worldwide society and content can travel all over the world very quickly.
• Even if you're not a pirate, getting licenses is "a distressing exercise."  This is especially the case in a world where everyone wants everything immediately.
• The copyright law is pretty outdated. A complete revision is essential.

Finally, Register Peters discussed some proposed solutions to some of the currently existing problems, including and noting that:

• We need to revise the copyright law, but this isn't realistic.  Nonetheless, individual problems can be solved legislatively.
• Giving the DOJ the power to shut down rogue web sites (proposed by Senator Leahy).
• Orphan works problem – limit the liability of people who do diligent searches for the copyright owner.  Google Books has stifled this.
• The private sector – creators and users – need to sit down and work out solutions.  Congress isn't going to do it.  Guidelines and best practices can and should be done.
• Licensing innovations.  Statutory licensing isn't a good idea, but collective licensing (along the lines of ASCAP and BMI) may be a good idea.  Fair use is not a good enough solution because of its uncertainty.

 Paul Michel

Judge Michel began by discussing the challenge he faced while sitting on the Federal Circuit.  He said, "The problem of being on the court is that you don't have 1^st Amendment rights."  He stepped down because he figured he could do more good off the court than on – trying to educate members of Congress and their staffers. 

Judge Michel then explained that he thought the key players who will be involved in trying to rebalance patent law are: (1) Congress, (2) Supreme Court; (3) PTO; (4) Federal Circuit; (5) White House; (6) mainstream media; (7) K-Street lobbyists.

Judge Michel commented on the pending patent reform legislation.  He predicted that a patent reform bill will pass, even if it doesn't do much.  The three most contentious issues, according to Judge Michel are: (1) first-to-file; (2) post-grant review; and (3) financing of the PTO (fee diversion from PTO to other government programs).  Judge Michel believes first-to-file will be adopted, but the scope of the grace period may be changed.  With respect to post-grant review, Judge Michel thought one of the two procedures will pass, but what the thresholds should be is an open question, although will probably be more modest than what was proposed in the Senate.  Finally, with respect to fee diversion, Judge Michel thought the House will not ban diversion.

Judge Michel concluded with a couple thoughts on Microsoft v. I4i and how the Federal Circuit will change.  He thinks the Supreme Court will reverse the Federal Circuit and apply a preponderance of the evidence standard across the board (i.e. get rid of the clear and convincing standard altogether). 

 With respect to changes to the Federal Circuit, Judge Michel predicted that there will be three additional slots opening on the court in the next 18 months.  The debate will be should the nominees be someone with an interest in patent law or more of a generalist.  The White House will obviously play a major role in the development of the court.

Patent Law Developments

Donald S. Chisum, Co-founder, Chisum Patent Academy, Author, Chisum on Patents

Mr. Chisum discussed updates in patent law during the past year.  Starting with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bilski, which dealt with patentable subject matter and rejected the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's machine or transformation test as the sole test for patentable processes, Mr. Chisum discussed how the Supreme Court's opinion has really left us in the dark with respect to what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea.   Then noting a couple of cases decided by the Federal Circuit, Mr. Chisum suggested that the Federal Circuit is refusing to define abstractness, despite the Supreme Court's instruction to do so.

Mr. Chisum next reviewed the Federal Circuit's opinion in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, which held that the written description requirement for patentability exists separately from the enablement requirement.

Afterward, Mr. Chisum reviewed a few pending Supreme Court cases – Global-Tech Appliances, Microsoft v. i4i, and Standford v. Roche Molecular Systems.  Global-Tech involves the question of whether deliberate indifference to a known risk (knowledge of a patent) meets the requirements of 271(b).  Mr. Chisum thought the Federal Circuit did a good job on this case and was surprised the Supreme Court took the case.  Microsoft v. i4i involves what the burden of proof for showing patent invalidity is for situations where the prior art was not before the PTO.  Stanford involves the assignment of rights by an employee/inventor to a third party and how this relates to the Bayh-Dole Act.

Mr. Chisum concluded with thoughts on inequitable conduct in the Therasense case, which is currently pending before the Federal Circuit and some interesting cases on obviousness in the wake of the Supreme Court's KSR decision.

Today was a busy day at the Supreme Court for IP cases.

First, the Court granted cert in Microsoft v. i4i, a patent case raising the question of whether an issued patent can be found invalid only upon a showing of invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.  The Patent Act provides that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid," but fails to indicate what level of proof is necessary.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has regularly held that the threshold is the clear and convincing standard, rather than the more common preponderance of the evidence standard.  The rationale for such a high level of proof for proving invalidity is based on the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office's expertise in technical matters and the courts' willingness to defer to the PTO's expertise.  However, the courts have continued to grant such deference to the PTO even in situations where the PTO has failed to review the prior art that may render the invention unpatentable.  In such a situation, the high level of deference is uncalled for.  The Supreme Court raised, but did not address, this question in its 2007 decision, KSR v. Teleflex ("We need not reach the question whether the failure to disclose [prior art during prosecution] voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is obvious despite the presumption.  We nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the presumption—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished here.").

Second, the Court denied cert in Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., a copyright case raising the issue of whether the "innocent infringer" defense to limit statutory damages is foreclosed by § 402(d) of the Copyright Act when the infringer downloads the music rather than acquires a traditional hard copy (e.g. compact disc).  In Harper, the defendant was a 16-year-old who downloaded infringing music files and argued that because of her age she did not know her conduct was infringing and therefore she should be able to take advantage of the innocent infringer defense found in § 504(c)(2) of the Copyright Act.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her argument and held that § 402(d) negated her innocent infringer defense.  Section 402(d) removes the innocent infringer defense when a notice of copyright (e.g. © 2010 Ryan Vacca) appears on the phonorecord to which the defendant had access.  The Fifth Circuit believed that such notice was sufficiently given by putting notice on the phonorecords, even though the defendant only accessed the music by downloading it online.

Although the Supreme Court denied cert, Justice Alito wrote a dissent (at p. 26) arguing that the Court should have taken the case to determine whether § 402(d) applies to downloaded music.  Justice Alito stressed that § 402(d) was written in a pre-digital music times and he was unsure if the Fifth Circuit's approach was a correct interpretation § 402(d) in a digital music world.  Unfortunately, unless a circuit split arises on this issue, the Supreme Court is unlikely to address this important question.

The third IP case of the day was the Court denying cert in Tiffany v. eBay (p. 15).  This trademark case involved whether eBay could be contributorily liable for trademark infringement based on the counterfeit goods sold by eBay users.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had previously held that eBay was not liable for contributory infringement because of the steps it had taken to remove counterfeit postings.  Although the Second Circuit's opinion was not a model of clarity providing guidance to others who host sites where trademark infringement may occur, the Supreme Court denying cert was not a big surprise.  For more on the Second Circuit's decision, see Eric Goldman's blog post here. (H/T to Steve Glista for the story on Tiffany v. eBay)

See my guest blog entry at Patently-O on the differences between copyright and patent exhaustion and the potential implications that the Supreme Court's Costco v. Omega decision may have.

The University of Akron School of Law and Sughrue Mion PLLC law firm will sponsor the 11^th annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy on Monday, March 9 from 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. at the John S. Knight Center in Akron.

Prominent leaders in the field of intellectual property and policy will speak at this year's symposium titled "Old Problems, New Directions." The symposium will feature a review of recent developments in patent, trademark and copyright law by noted experts in the field. It will also include a review of the PTO's new disciplinary rules and a panel discussion on the likely impact of the Obama administration on IP policy. The featured luncheon speaker will be Chief Judge Paul R. Michel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

CLE credit is being offered. For registration and the full program schedule, click here.

Co-sponsor Sughrue Mion celebrates more than 50 years as an international intellectual property law firm specializing in patent, trademark, copyright, Internet, trade secret and unfair competition law.  The sponsorship is in memory of founding partner Richard C. Sughrue.

On Friday the Federal Circuit issued its long-awaited en banc decision in In re Bilski (No. 2007-1130 , Serial No. 08/833,892), clarifying the legal test for patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The nine of twelve judges who signed the majority opinion announced a "machine-or-transformation" test for patentable subject matter.  Although urged to do so by Judge Mayer in dissent, they declined to overrule State Street-the 1998 decision that has produced a flood of software and business-method patents.  The rule they announced, however, replaces the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test of State Street.

Under the new rule, inventions involving "fundamental principles"-laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas-are patentable only if they use the fundamental principles in a specific machine or in a process that transforms a specific article into another state or thing.  In order to pass that test, the machine or process of transformation must involve more than "insignificant extra-solution activity," i.e., structure or steps beyond applying a formula, algorithm or other fundamental principle.

In announcing the new test, the en banc majority took pains to discuss and reject several alternatives, including some that the Federal Circuit had previously endorsed in panel and even en banc decisions.  One was the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test of State Street and an earlier en banc decision (In re Alappat).  Another was the so-called Freeman-Walter-Abele test, which excludes patent claims that pre-empt (cover) all practical uses of an algorithm.  The Bilski majority repudiated each of these tests as "inadequate" in themselves and "no longer valid."  It also rejected the "mental steps" test, which held a process claim unpatentable if the process can be performed entirely in one's mind.

While rejecting the alternative tests as legal norms, the majority explained how the results of each-at least the correct results-might be reached by applying the new machine-or-transformation test.  A purely mental process, for example, might fail that test for lack of a tangible machine or transformed article in the claim's most general form.  In that sense the "mental steps" test may be consistent with the theoretical basis of the machine-or-transformation test, "namely the prevention of pre-emption of fundamental principles."

The majority also rejected tests proposed by various amici curiae.  One was a test based on an attempt to define "technology" or "technological arts."  The majority saw such a test as having no basis in the statute and creating uncertainty as technology advances.  It also rejected proposed categorical exclusions of software and business-method inventions, preferring to assess those special categories of inventions case by case under the machine-or-transformation test.  Yet the majority noted how its own test might also exclude patentability for business methods:

"Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances."

Applying its test to an invention that claimed risk-hedging transactions for commodities investing, but did not mention any machine or article, the majority found the claims nonstatutory.

Besides its new subject matter test, the majority opinion in Bilski had several notable features.  First, it began by carefully parsing the language of relevant Supreme Court precedent.  That in itself was somewhat novel.  In some of the very decisions that it abandoned, the Federal Circuit had analyzed its own precedent in great detail, giving short shrift to decisions of our highest court.

In recent appeals, the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal Circuit's formalistic rulings at least six times.  Perhaps that poor "batting average" is finally having an impact.  Whatever the reason, the Bilski majority repeatedly emphasized the Supreme Court's guidance.  It carefully developed an understanding of what it saw as the Supreme Court's preferred test, thereby acknowledging its own subordinate position in our judicial system, despite its presumed patent expertise.

The second notable point of Bilski was the majority's view of the subject-matter inquiry.  It ruled that subject matter is or can be a threshold test, to be applied before the other substantive requirements of patents-namely, novelty, utility, nonobviousness and proper disclosure.  While refusing to endorse threshold treatment in every case, the Bilski majority held threshold treatment proper and acceptable.

That point could affect patent litigation.  If there is no dispute over the interpretation of claims, the district court could decide a subject-matter challenge to a patent by summary judgment.  If the court found no patentable subject matter, it could dispose of the case without the considerable expense and delay of full-blown patent litigation.  It could avoid as many as two trips to the Federal Circuit-one for definitive claim construction and a second for review of the district court's decision on infringement and remedies.

The third notable point of Bilski was its treatment of patent claims' breadth. Several earlier Federal-Circuit decisions had deemphasized claim breadth.  They had viewed breadth as the sole concern of Section 112, which deals with proper disclosure, rather than Section 101, which governs patentable subject matter.  Judge Newman, in her dissent in Bilski, forcefully argued for continuing this same approach. 

Yet limiting breadth to Section 112 is a bit like arguing that two plus two cannot be four because one and three are.  That fact that one statutory section implicates breadth does not mean another does not also.

Both Sections 112 and 101 necessarily involve a patent's breadth.  Disclosure implicates breadth because the claims must be narrow enough to receive support from the disclosed specification.  But the claims' breadth also implicates proper subject matter because the claims define the invention.

Before one can determine whether an invention constitutes statutory subject matter, one must know what the invention is.  The breadth of a patent's claims provide the answer. Under the new test, breadth also reveals whether the invention may be a fundamental principle divorced from any machine or transformation, or a principle appropriately limited to a specified machine or article transformation.  The breadth of a patent's claims is therefore inextricably tied to both the nature of the invention and its status as patentable subject matter vel non.

The Bilski majority applied these principles to the famous eighth claim in Reilly v. Morse, which involved Morse's telegraph machine.  That claim covered any use of electromagnetism to transmit intelligible information at a distance, and the focus of the subject-matter inquiry was quite properly its breadth.  Unlimited to any particular machine, the claim would have monopolized a whole unexplored field of technology by claiming a scientific principle.  Today it would cover not just telegraphy, but telephone, radio, television, satellite communication, and the Internet-none of which Morse invented.  Avoiding just that sort of gross overbreadth, which can arise from claiming a fundamental principle, is one of the main statutory and constitutional purposes of Section 101.

The Bilski majority explicitly reaffirmed that analyzing a claim's breadth or scope is part of assessing patentable subject matter under the machine-or-transformation test.  As the majority put it, "the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-eligibility" (emphasis added).  In addition, the limits must be real and practical: "the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity."

The final notable aspect of the majority opinion was its humility and judicial restraint.  In the past, the Federal Circuit has been all too ready to adopt its own legal tests and formalistic rules-an approach that often proved troublesome later.   So the en banc majority abandoned it.  Having assiduously extracted the "machine-or-transformation" test from the Supreme Court's precedent, it recited that test repeatedly and resolved to stick to it.  While noting a probable need for future modification, it promised to leave that to the high court.

Greater wisdom underlay this restraint and humility.  For the first time, an en banc majority of the Federal Circuit appeared to realize how difficult it is to get patentable subject matter right.  As the cutting edges of biology and computer science enter the realm of pure information, a patent law designed for the mechanical and chemical inventions of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries might fail to protect and encourage real technological advance.  At the same time, patents on business transactions, fundamental principles and what people do in their heads-let alone law, literature, religion and government-might create harmful monopolies, impede commerce and industry and retard, not promote, technological progress.  No formal rule can ever resolve the tension between these two truths.  Nor can it reduce the difficulty of charting a safe path between two harmful extremes.

The Bilski majority recognized the tension, acknowledging the nature and the difficulty of the subject-matter inquiry.  Within the contours of the four key terms in Section 101 (process, machine, manufacture and composition of matter) and the Federal Circuit's own new test, it recognized the essential nature of the inquiry as part of the federal common-law process.  Like other federal common law, the test for patentable subject matter ought to develop case by case.  The guidance of a higher court with greater experience in resolving a wide range of difficult common-law issues should be helpful in that development.

Besides the nine-judge majority opinion, there were four others, three nominally dissenting and one concurring.  Judges Newman and Rader each wrote separate dissents, rejecting the majority's machine-or-transformation rule as too narrow and too begrudging of incentives for innovation in the information age.  Judge Mayer wrote separately to reject the majority's rule as too unclear and uncertain; he would have outlawed business-method patents entirely and overruled State Street and its progeny-a step that the majority failed (at least explicitly) to take.  Judges Dyk and Linn wrote a joint concurrence solely to support the majority's opinion and refute Judge Newman's lengthy historical analysis of English and American patent law.

Although Judge Mayer styled his separate opinion a "dissent," he would have disallowed the Bilski patent as one claiming a business method.  So his opinion is properly classified as a concurrence in result, albeit with vastly different rationale.  Accordingly, the no-patent result in the case, as distinguished from the machine-or-transformation rule, attracted the votes of ten judges, with only Judges Newman and Rader viewing the invention at bar as patentable subject matter.  In that limited sense, Bilski was a 10-2 decision.

An appeal in the case, if made, seems unlikely to succeed.  The alleged invention was a pure business method, claimed in the most abstract and sweeping terms.  The Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the decision to exclude it as unpatentable subject matter, for such a decision would contravene nearly unanimous scholarly opinion opposing that sort of patent, which Judge Meyer summarized.  Rather than take certiorari merely to adjust the Federal Circuit's verbal formula (an approached abjured in Warner-Jenkinson), the high court will probably wait to see how the new verbal formula works in practice before intervening.

Akron Law with the cooperation of the U.S. Export Assistance Center in Cleveland, will present a half-day program on Monday, Nov. 10 from 8 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. describing how Northeast Ohio businesses and exporters can protect their patents, copyrights and trademarks in the United States and overseas markets.

The program will provide basic information on intellectual property (IP) and how businesses can exploit it in local, regional, national and international markets. The course is designed primarily for businesses that have not yet established IP programs and procedures. It will cover what IP protects, how to secure protection at home and abroad, and important pitfalls and opportunities in IP law. It will also describe the assistance the United States Commercial Service offers small businesses in finding foreign customers and business partners and beginning export trade, and programs to assist U.S. companies to protect their intellectual property rights in foreign markets.

The event will be held at the Sheraton Independence Hotel, 5300 Rockside Road in Independence, Ohio. The registration fee is $50 and includes a continental breakfast. Call 330-972-7988 or e-mail sfauppe@uakron.edu to register.