Until its recent decision in Citizens United v. F.E.C. (2010), the Supreme Court has consistently upheld laws restricting the flow of money to candidates in political campaigns. 

     Campaign finance legislation traces back to 1907 when the federal government enacted the Tillman Act prohibiting corporations from contributing to political campaigns.  In 1947 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act which prohibited unions, as well, from making political contributions.  In 1972 the Federal Election Campaign Act was enacted requiring candidates to disclose the identity of contributors and the amounts that they contributed, and in 1974 Congress amended FECA to limit the amount of money that any single individual could contribute to a candidate or to all candidates in an election cycle. 

     FECA left two very large loopholes in place: the law allowed individuals to contribute money to political parties that was then distributed to candidates, and the law permitted individuals to make "independent expenditures"  for campaign advertisements on behalf of political candidates.  In effect, political parties were "money laundering" for wealthy individuals who wished to make additional contributions to candidates, and the "independent" advertisements supporting specific candidates or attacking their opponents were simply another means of purchasing influence with a candidate.  In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act closed both loopholes by requiring political parties to report the source and amount of any money funnelled to candidates, and imposing the same requirements for any campaign ads broadcast before a primary or general election.  This law, also called "McCain-Feingold," also made the individual contribution limits applicable to money that was given to candidates by political parties or that was spent on any campaign commercials that are broadcast.

   Until this year the Supreme Court had held that these laws were constitutional.  The contribution limits set forth in FECA and contained in a state law were approved in Buckley v. Valeo  (1976) and Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (2000), a prohibition on corporate spending on campaign advertisements was upheld in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), and the provisions of BCRA eliminating the flow of "soft money" through political parties and campaign advertisements were upheld in McConnell v. F.E.C. (2003). 

Accordingly, before Citizens United, it was constitutional for law to limit the flow of money into political campaign in the following ways:

1.  Corporations and unions may not contribute money directly to candidates or spend money on campaign advertisements for candidates.  Instead, they must create "political action committees," by means of which individuals associated with the corporation or union may contribute money to a fund that is used to make contributions or purchase advertising.

2.  No individual may contribute more than $2,300 per year to any particular candidate for federal office, whether the money is donated directly to the candidate or funnelled through a political party or other advocacy organization.

3.  The source and amount of each contribution must be disclosed.

       It is also important to note what campaign finance laws may not do under the Constitution.  First, the law may not limit the amount of money that politicians spend on their campaigns.  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court distinguished campaign contributions from campaign expenditures in two ways.  Campaign expenditures, said the Court, constitute a pure form of speech, while campaign contributions are a form of political association.  In addition, the danger of corruption is far more directly related to campaign contributions than to campaign expenditures.  Accordingly, the government is permitted to regulate campaign contributions, but may not regulate the total amount of money that a candidate spends on an election.

     Second, the campaign finance laws have never attempted to regulate what media corporations say and do, because this would probably be a straightforward violation of freedom of the press.

     Third, unions, corporations, and advocacy organizations have a constitutional right to spend money from their treasuries to run "issue advertisements" at any time – on referenda, for example – so long as these are not attempts to favor one candidate or another.

     Fourth, the limitations on spending for campaign advertising do not apply to company or union newsletters or to the internet.  These organizations are permitted to communicate with their members through normal channels.

     Finally, unions, corporations, and advocacy organizations probably have a constitutial right to form PACs, facilitating a process by means of which their members who are willing may pool their money to contribute to candidates or to purchase advertisements.  In addition, it is possible that advocacy organizations may have the power to contribute money directly to candidates, since their members presumably are willing to make their voices heard in this manner.  However, all of this spending would presumably be subject to the individual contribution limits and reporting requirements of state and federal law.

     Justice Kennedy consistently dissented from the past rulings of the Supreme Court upholding limits on campaign contributions.  In tomorrow's post I will describe the positions that he has taken in these cases.

Visit Professor Huhn's website on Constitutional Law for information and links to sources – both timely and historical – on constitutional law.

Food for thought here.

The CIA, Homeland Security and the Defense Dept. were busy this week responding to investigations of 2009’s terrorist incidents, answering Congressional questions, and voicing concerns about the adequacy of the defense budget.  Find out when we can expect terrorist attacks and what is cyber war?  Also read the reports below on related topics that were issued from three of my favorite government agencies, Government Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office.

CIA Before the Senate Intelligence Committee  – Terrorist Attacks within Six Months!

CIA Director Leon Panetta testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday (Feb. 2). The hearing was to examine current and projected threats to the U.S.  No hearing transcripts are available yet but the video can be found here.

Here is what Panetta had to say- “Al-Qaeda can be expected to attempt an attack on the United States in the next three to six months.  The terrorist organization is deploying operatives to the United States to carry out new attacks from inside the country, including "clean" recruits with a negligible trail of terrorist contacts.“  Summarized in a news story here.

Cyber War

Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, at the same hearing presented the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community report.  The report focuses on the evolving threat of cyber attacks.  Cyber attacks (sometimes called cyber war) “are occurring on an unprecedented scale with extraordinary sophistication.”  “This cyber domain is exponentially expanding our ability to create and share knowledge, but it is also enabling those who would steal, corrupt, harm or destroy the public and private assets vital to our national interests. The recent intrusions reported by Google are a stark reminder of the importance of these cyber assets, and a wake-up call to those who have not taken this problem seriously.”

See Google’s own blog about China’s use of cyber attacks on Google’s gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. 

See Time.com’s coverage on cyberwar here,  New York Times series on the topic here,  and Frontline’s multimedia page (slightly old but good for past incidents) here.

In response, on Feb. 4^th the House passed the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act (H.R. 4061) which provides nearly $1 billion dollars for federal cybersecurity under the 2010 budget.  More here.

More here:

President Obama Directs the National Security and Homeland Security Advisors to Conduct Immediate Cyber Security Review Posted on February 09, 2009.

Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure  Posted on May 29, 2009.

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Homeland Security,  but with Criticism from GAO and Congressional Research Search

The Department of Homeland Security delivered to Congress the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Report, A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, on February 1, 2010. The report outlines the strategic framework to guide the activities of participants in homeland security toward a common end.  The report lays out the roles and responsibilities of the various government agencies and the missions and goals for Homeland Security.

“The purpose of the first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) is to outline the strategic framework to guide the activities of participants in homeland security toward a common end. A safe and secure homeland must mean more than preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out. It must also ensure that the liberties of all Americans are assured, privacy is protected, and the means by which we interchange with the world – through travel, lawful immigration, trade, commerce, and exchange- are secured." (Source: page vii.)

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GAO Report:  Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security.

The title is quite a mouthful, but it is GAO’s study following the December 25, 2009 bombing attempted of flight 253.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released the 26 page report on Jan. 27 here.     The GAO pointed out flaws in the current system and referenced another report they released in October 2007.  The adjustments suggested in the 2007 report were never made. 

“In October 2007, we released a report on the results of our review—conducted at your request—of how the watchlist is created and maintained, and how federal, state, and local security partners use the list to screen individuals for potential threats to the homeland.   As a result of that review, we identified potential vulnerabilities, including ones created because agencies were not screening against all records in the watchlist. We made a number of recommendations aimed at addressing these potential vulnerabilities and helping to enhance the effectiveness of the watchlist process, which the agencies have not yet fully addressed.” (Emphasis added.)

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Congressional Research Service Report on National Counterterrorism Center- Responsibilities and potential Congressional Concerns

Two recent incidents- the Fort Hood Army Base attack on Nov. 5, 2009 and the bomb attempt of flight 253 on Dec. 25, 2009 led to an increase concern about the U.S. domestic counterterrorism capabilities.  “Attention has focused on the NCTC which is responsible for ensuring both the sharing of information and for all-source analysis of terrorist issues.”

This 13 page report lays out areas of potential Congressional concerns about the NCTC and lists the human errors associated with these two incidents.  Also  – “Although no system is infallible and the possibility of human errors has to be assumed, recent attacks appear to demonstrate specific failures by the Intelligence Community to “connect the dots,” to bring together disparate pieces of information to provide clear warning of an impending attack. In regard to the December attack, President Obama stated that, “this was not a failure to collect intelligence; it was a failure to integrate and understand the intelligence that we already had.” (see page 1)

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Defense Dept. 2011 Budget Proposal, and 2010 War Funding Supplemental Request – Update

From beSpacific blog:

News release: "President Barack Obama sent to Congress a proposed defense budget of $708 billion for fiscal 2011. The budget request for the Department of Defense (DoD) includes $549 billion in discretionary budget authority to fund base defense programs and $159 billion to support overseas contingency operations (OCO), primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. This proposal continues the reform agenda established in last year's DoD budget request and builds on the initiatives identified by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The QDR examines DoD strategies and priorities. It assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces and re-balances DoD’s strategies, capabilities, and forces to ensure the U.S. military has the flexibility to address today’s conflicts and tomorrow’s threats. The BMDR evaluates the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. and its allies and articulates policy. It determines the appropriate role of ballistic missile defense in the country’s national security and military strategies."

"Key highlights of the proposed DoD budget are here and here. For more information and to view the entire fiscal 2011 budget proposal, go here and download the "FY 2011 Budget Request Overview Book."

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Congressional Budget Office analyzes the DoD Budget

The DoD gets support from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  CBO's Analysis of Scenarios for Funding the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Letter from the executive director of the CBO to John M. Spratt Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget, January 21, 2010.  The first paragraph says it all.

 "As you requested, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has analyzed both the funding needed to support an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan and the reduction in costs resulting from the ongoing withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-118, 111 H.R. 3326 ) provides $130 billion for war-related operations in 2010. Based on recent trends in spending on overseas operations, the Department of Defense (DoD) would probably require further appropriations in 2010 to support an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan as well as other war-related operations."

If the 2010 Defense budget is not enough, is the 2011 budget adequate?

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Is there a law of war?  Yes, and it is issued by the Dept. of Defense!

The Law of War Deskbook, was recently issued by the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army.  The expected audience is the beginning and intermediate level practitioner, but you can read it yourself.  The PDF copy is here and is 248 pages long.  Using the Adobe Reader search tool is one way to quickly find topics in the book.

From the preface:  “Together with the Operational Law Handbook and Law of War Documentary Supplement, these three volumes represent the range of international and operational law subjects taught to military judge advocates. These outlines, while extensive, make no pretence of comprehensively covering this complex area of law.”

“This Deskbook is not a substitute for official publications. Similarly, it should not be considered to espouse an “official” position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. While every effort has been made to ensure that the material contained herein is current and correct, it should be remembered that these are merely a collection of teaching outlines, collected, bound, and distributed as a matter of instructional convenience, intended only to introduce students to the law and point them to primary sources of that law.” 

Topics covered:  legal basis for use of force, wounded and sick in the field, prisoners of war, occupation and post-conflict governance, means and method of warfare, human rights, war crimes and command responsibility.

Here and here.

Akron Law is offering Study Abroad programs for students and attorneys.  Visit http://www.uakron.edu/law/studyabroad/index.dot for more information.

Last year, 1.5 MILLION Americans received hospice services from over 4,000 hospice providers. Since 2001, the number of hospice patients has increased by 22 percent and the median length of stay of a hospice patient went from 20.5 days to 22 days. Hospice Care and the related Ethical and Legal Concerns of End-of-Life Care are increasingly becoming an important topic for discussion as more than 78 million Americans begin to turn 60 this decade.  This continuing education program is offered in two sessions on Friday, Feb. 19 at 8 – 11:45 a.m. OR 12:30 – 4:15 p.m.

For more information click here.

Cost: 
Social Worker and Nursing Continuing Education $75
Continuing Legal Education
              Akron Law Alumni or Akron Bar Association Member $105
              Non-Alumni/Non-Member $130
              Cost includes three hours CLE (including one hour of ethics)

Register:
Phone:  330-972-6363, E-mail:  manovac@uakron.edu
Online:  www.uakron.edu/law/continuinged

"I think people need to get past the view that you can't have a successful life without one day owning a home." This from the Atlantic's Business blog, agreeing with Barney Frank's apparent suggestion that the poor should be encouraged to rent, rather than to buy homes. What do you think? Is owning a home part of the American dream that poor people should participate in? I was struck by the point (which I've seen before) that home ownership reduces labor mobility. A lot of people right now can't move to where the jobs are because they are stuck with a house they can't sell.

More here.

Last week I posted information on how to track corporate election contributions under federal election law.  This week I will show you where to find campaign contributions for Ohio elections.

States regulate campaign finance three ways: disclosure, contribution limits and public financing.   All states require some level of disclosure on the amount and source of contributions and expenditures.  Until recently, states could limit the amount and source of campaign contributions which included corporate giving.  Several states offer public financing to candidates or political parties.  There are limits and regulations associated with public financing and the grants only cover a small portion of the campaign costs.  Source. 

State Election Contribution Limits

Contribution limits can take the form of:  who can receive contributions (candidates, political parties and political action committees), who can contribute (i.e., no unions or corporations), when contributions are permitted (i.e., not permitted during legislative session), and the amount of contribution.   As of January 25, 2010, there are 24 states that prohibit or restrict corporate or union contributions for candidates.  Ohio is one of those 24 states.   See chart.  Ohio corporate campaign laws are listed at the bottom of this post. 

“It is important to note that the Citizens United v. FEC decision does not strike down bans on corporate and union contributions to candidates, which currently exist in 23 states. Only the ban on direct corporate and union spending on campaign advertising is addressed by this decision.”  Source.

How to Find Political Contributions in Ohio

The Ohio Secretary of State supervises the administration of election laws and compiles campaign finance reports and statistics. 

For campaign disclosure information for past elections, begin here.  There are two ways to search Ohio’s campaign finance data. 

1. Use the Search Candidates and Committees link to access the Campaign Finance Query System.  This is the easiest method.  The tabs along the top allow users to search by candidate, political parties, Political Action Committees (PACs), and county political parties.  Choose your tab and then at the next screen pick contributions or expenditures.  You can search by name of candidate, contributor, city, zip code, amount of money, etc.  The results of the search can be viewed in the browser, printed or downloaded. 

 For a sample search I looked for contributors to the gubernatorial election 0f 2006, enter:

City =AKRON (enter any city using all capital letters) or use the zip code search box.

Report Type = pre-general  (for before the general election.  Can also search for primaries, special elections, annual, or monthly data).

Office = governor  (state elected officials, elected judges and retirement board elections are available).

Order by= I chose YEAR and DESCENDING so that the chart will display the latest election first.  Other options to sort by are contributor’s name, address, amount of money, committee name, etc.

Output Format = HTML, EXCEL or ASCII.  I chose HTML so that it displays in the browser.  The Excel option allows you to save the spreadsheet to your computer.

Run Report = click the Run Report button to generate the table.

The web site is slow so be patient.  The resulting chart lists individual and PACs contributions to the various candidates that ran for governor.  2006 data is displayed first. Click NEXT at the bottom of the chart to go to the next page.

There are other parameters to use for your search.  You may wish to narrow your search by year, or by amount of money, or by a candidate’s name.  To catch the last Presidential election, you can narrow the years using a BEGIN date of 01/01/2006 and the END date of 12/31/2008.

Conducting a similar search under the Political Action Committee (PAC) tab produces a list of contributors to each PAC.  The PACs listed include insurance companies, unions, banks, law firms, corporations, professional associations and public interest groups.  In summary, searching by PAC tells you who contributed to the PAC, and searching by candidate tells you which PACs supported what candidate. 

 2.   The second way to obtain campaign finance data is to use the Download Common Reports Via FTP.  For this method “the most commonly requested campaign finance data have already been queried and placed in a downloadable file.”  The file can be opened in many spreadsheet or database programs.  The choices are organized by contributions or expenditures for candidates, political parties or PACs.   Some of the data goes back to 1994!  I downloaded a few of the files and opened them in Excel.  It wasn’t that difficult.

Also under this option is a list of active candidates and an Active PAC List, both dated Jan. 28, 2010.  I searched for someone who is rumored to be a candidate but they were not listed, which may indicate a slight time lag between filing as a candidate to making it to the list on the web site.  The OHIO PAC list has over 1000 entities listed!

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NOTE: Ohio’s election law R.C. 3517.103 was already declared unconstitutional by a state court case in August 2009!

See the Personal Funds Statute Warning  more here.

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Ohio Corporate Contribution Laws

Below are the existing Ohio laws.  Look for changes in these laws in the future due to the recent U.S. Supreme Court Case.

No corporation, no nonprofit corporation, and no labor organization, directly or indirectly, shall pay or use, or offer, advise, consent, or agree to pay or use, the organization’s money or property for or in aid of or opposition to a political party, a candidate for election or nomination to public office, a political action committee including a political action committee of the corporation or labor organization, a legislative campaign fund, or any organization that supports or opposes any such candidate, or for any partisan political purpose.  §3599.03

No person shall make, during the thirty days preceding a primary election or during the thirty days preceding a general election, any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate using any contributions received from a corporation or labor organization.  §3517.1011(H)

Other Useful Links

National Conference of State Legislatures- Elections and Campaigns

National Conference of State Legislatures-  contributions limits with links to charts.  

Campaign Finance Legislation Database.  Search by states, topics related to campaign finance and year.  You can search for 2010 to find current changes in state election laws, but only some of the state legislatures are in session right now.  Many state elections laws will be affected by the Supreme Court opinion and will need to be brought into compliance with the ruling. 

Election Law @ Moritz web site and blogs sponsored by Ohio State University.  

Brookings Institute, on Campaign Finance.

And some reflections on what an interesting 5 years it has been.  All here.

     Bills pending in Congress may return pleadings in federal courts to the "notice pleading"  standard.     In its 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court concluded that notice pleading, as defined in its prior case of Conley v. Gibson, would no longer control the factual detail that must be pleaded for a complaint in federal court to survive a motion to dismiss.  In Conley, the Court had concluded that not much in the way of factual detail would be necessary in a complaint. 

Under the Conley standard, a complaint would survive a motion to dismiss unless "it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."  

    In Twombly, the Supreme Court held that the Conley standard would no longer control in federal court.  Instead, the Court articulated what has come to be called a "plausibility pleading" standard.  The Twombly Court, thus, concluded as follows:

"While a Complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" for his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.  Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."

     Why do pleading standards matter?  It is generally the case that the less a plaintiff must plead to survive a motion to dismiss, the more the system assists plaintiffs whose case cannot be made without obtaining information from the defendant — what we refer to as "discovery" from the defendant.  Permitting complaints that are short on factual detail to survive, thus, will provide most assistance to those who need information from the defendant to prove their case.  Permitting complaints with less detail to survive the motion to dismiss, however, also has its costs — in general, the cases will last longer, and the litigation will cost more.  Thus, the sufficiency of pleading debate can be seen as a debate about the fairness and efficiency of our current litigation system and how we want that litigation system to function in the future

     In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, decided in 2009, the Court clarified that the new "plausibility" standard of Twombly would apply to all complaints, not just antitrust complaints or complaints in other complex cases.  Iqbal further elaborated on the "plausibility" standard.  The Iqbal Court confirmed that a court must still accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true, but emphasized that this requirement is not applicable to legal conclusions that a plaintiff may allege: "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."  Further, the Court reiterated that only a "plausible" claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss and discussed "facial plausibility" as follows: 

      A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . .  Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant’s liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’"  . . .

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not "show[n]"—"that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).  

      Now Congress is entering the "sufficiency of pleading" debate.  Two bills pending in Congress would turn back the clock to pre-Twombly days, would overrule Twombly and Iqbal, and would  restore notice pleading as the threshhold for a sufficient federal court complaint.  In July 2009, Senator Specter introduced S. 1504, entitled “the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009,” which would restore the pleadings standards of Conley v. Gibson.  The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on this bill on December 2, 2009, entitled “Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?”  The Senate hearing can be accessed here.

     On November 19, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler, D-NY, introduced H.R. 4115, entitled “Open Access to Courts Act of 2009,” and which would also provide for a return to notice pleading in federal courts. The text is available here.  On October 27, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the bill, which is entitled, "Access to Justice Denied:  Ashcroft v. Iqbal."   Three of four witnesses who spoke at the hearing favored a return to the pre-Twombly standards.  Transcripts of the hearing can be accessed here.

Akron Law will host a lecture by John Head, professor of law at the University of Kansas School of Law. The lecture, which is free and open to the public, is titled “China’s Legal Soul – The Modern Chinese Legal Identity in Historical Context” and will be held Tuesday, Feb. 2  at 4 p.m. in Room 151 at Akron Law, 150 University Ave., Akron, Ohio. A reception will immediately follow the lecture.

In his presentation, Head will draw from his most recent book on Chinese law to offer observations on two key questions. First, is there a “rule of law” in China – and if so, what form does it take? Second, what might we consider the “legal soul” of modern China, providing that vibrant society with its central spirit or ideology?  In addressing these issues, Head highlights the dramatic legal reform movement occurring in China today, almost exactly a century after the collapse of the (official) dynastic form of governance, in which Imperial Confucianism served (in Head’s view) as the “legal soul” of the society.

I think not.

The recent Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. FEC, deals with corporations, unions and other groups contributing to independent campaign advertising.  This case is discussed by others in this blog.     

Related to this case, did you know that campaign contributions are made publically available by the Federal Election Commission?  You can find out who contributed, how much to what candidate.   With a few extra steps you can trace it back to a corporation.  Instructions on how to find this information follows.

 Individuals’ Contributions

We will fist look at searching for individual contributions because it is rather easy.  Find out who contributed in the last political campaign and how much was donated to each candidate.  The Federal Election Commission web site provides this data and is easy to search.

Contributions to the 2008 Presidential Campaign are available here.  Search by donor’s name, by city or zip code.  When searching by name, enter the last name in the search box, then a comma, and then the first name.  So to search for the Ohio Governor’s contributions, the search would look like this  -  strickland, ted.  Try searching for celebrities or your own name!

Search here to find out how much an individual donated over several campaigns.

Want community wide figures?

Click on Ohio on this map, and then holding your mouse over Akron (zip code 443xx), and it will show that $493,833 was donated by individuals in the last Presidential Campaign.  Hmmmm.  It looks like Kent (zip 442xx) donated more ($691,349)!

To get data broken down for Akron, at the Presidential Campaign Finance page, click the down arrow and select to search by city.  Searching “Akron” generates a chart of people who live in Akron, how much they donated and to which candidate.  After a chart is displayed, columns can be sorted so try sorting the displayed chart by state, zip code or candidate’s name.  (There are other communities called Akron in the country so sort by state to get Akron, Ohio data grouped together.)

Corporation Contributions

Now for the fun part but not an easy search in this database!  First, you can search by Political Action Committees (PAC) or other political group/party (i.e., Green Party) by starting here.  Select the 2007-2008 election cycle.  Then search by your candidate’s last name.  At the next screen, click on your candidate’s name and then click on the Non-Party (PACs) link.   See how much money was donated by the unions, professional associations and PACs.  Some corporations form a PAC and donate that way.  So for instance, Goodyear’s PAC is called Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company Good Government Fund.

Next, in the list of Committees who gave to the candidate, click on the name of the PAC you are interested in.  I chose the National Rifle Association (NRA).  Click on the Contributions Received link.  Sometimes in the list of contributors you will see corporate donors listed.  For my NRA example we see that Microsoft Corp. Political Action Committee donated money to the NRA PAC back in 2000.  (Why would Microsoft donate to the NRA?)  So a corporate PAC can donate to an association’s PAC who eventually contributes to a candidate. 

This is one way to find corporate contributions.  It is rather difficult and requires several steps.  There is an easier way! 

Another web site that tracks Political Action Committees is  OpenSecrets.org.     It is not a government site.  Find out which PAC corporations are donating to which candidates.   Search for the corporation in the search box in the upper right corner of the OpenSecrets.org web page.  Change the campaign cycle using the drop down arrow in the middle of the page.  Let’s change it to the 2008 campaign cycle and we’ll try searching Microsoft again.  You get charts of spending and list of candidates supported (click recipients).  The list of donors shows who contributed to the corporate PAC.   So if you want to make it difficult for others to see who you contribute to, donate to a corporate PAC who in turn donates to an association PAC, who then donates to a candidate! 

 Independent Groups’ contributions

The Campaign Finance Institute  tracks campaign contributions by outside groups.  The institute is a non-partisan, non-profit institute affiliated with The George Washington University.   Independent Expenditures in 2008 General Election are found here (columns can be sorted),   click here for interests groups, and here for general financing of the campaign.

See this Wall Street Journal article which explains the effect the Supreme Court ruling will have on independent group spending on future election campaigns.  Some of the largest independent groups that contributed to the 2008 General Election are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents businesses ($36.4 million) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Labor Union ($27 million).

The fundamental premise of the Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC is that a corporation should have the same First Amendment rights to engage in political speech as any citizen, because a corporation is simply an "association of citizens" in the "corporate form." I think this is going to lead to the politicization of everyday economic life.

The Court's reasoning that corporate speech is simply the collective speech of individual citizens does ring true for certain non-profit, ideologically-oriented corporations, especially when they are membership-driven. When the NRA or the Sierra Club takes members' dues and uses that money to speak on political issues, they in a rough way are simply amplifying the voices of their members, even if an individual member disagrees with one policy or another advocated by the group. That person can always quit.

BUT I don't think that most stockholders in for-profit corporations think that those corporations represent the stockholders' political views. We expect that corporation to be an economic actor, to be interested in making money, and to be generally agnostic with regard to political matters. They are the subjects of government regulation, not the makers of government regulation. Yes, we understand that our bank probably has a lobbyist that advocates a position with regard to banking regulation, but they aren't representing us in any but the most attenuated way. I suppose there's a sense in which we expect the bank to favor regulation that allows them to make money in the long run, but that could lead them to either support or oppose any particular proposal, depending on their political ideology, and I doubt that many people choose their bank based on its political ideology and attitude towards regulation.

So we tend to think of our market decisions and our political advocacy in different ways. We buy the best or the cheapest pizza without regard to whether the founder of the company and its top executives ardently oppose abortion.  We buy stocks of promising corporations without regard to whether its board of directors believes that global warming is a hoax.

This is of course a false barrier, and always has been. And it has already been breaking down. Recently several companies resigned from the Chamber of Commerce because of its strong political stance in opposition to legislation aimed at climate change. In the last election cycle there were websites rating companies as "blue' or "red" based on the proportion of employee contributions given to one party or the other. Readers were encouraged to support those companies that reflected the readers' political allegiances.

SO NOW the Supreme Court has exposed the connection between our political and economic commitments, and cognitive dissonance is no longer sustainable. The Court is telling us that Wal-Mart's speech is our speech when it works to oppose fair pay rules. That the Teamsters' speech is our speech when it opposes trade agreements. That Citibank speaks for us when it fights against banking regulation.

I don't see how I can now avoid making political calculations with regard to my investments and purchases. No, I won't be able to be pure in my judgments, and yes my decisions surely will be incomplete and inconsistent.  But the Court's decision challenges those who disagree with certain aspects of free market ideology to step out of it. It tells us that our corporate associations are not only economic but political. It's on.

    The Supreme Court today handed down its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  In this case the Supreme Court overrules longstanding precedent and gives corporations the right to spend unlimited amounts of money on campaign advertisements.  Here is a link to the decision on the Cornell website.  The Supreme Court site seems to be overwhelmed.  I will summarize the decision in a later posting.

By a 5-4 vote–more here (you might need to scroll down a bit).

The 12th Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy will be held in Akron on March 8, 2010.  The featured luncheon speaker will be the newly-appointed Commissioner for Patents Robert L. Stoll.  The program will include presentations by leading practitioners and academics on the major issues of the day affecting intellectual property law.  Presenters will discuss, among other topics, the Bilski case, the proposed Google Books Library Project settlement, the doctrines of inequitable conduct and fraud, and the host of ethical and other issues associated with the practice of outsourcing work.

Early Bird Registration Fee $250 (on or before Feb. 22, 2010), Full Registration Fee $325 (after Feb. 22, 2010), Faculty Registration Fee $100, Student Registration FREE.  Online registration is now available.  Visit www.uakron.edu/law for further information.

          Two of five cases the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear last week deal with the procedure or remedies that govern in federal court.  Both decisions may be important to federal court litigants in a wide variety of cases.

           In Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., the Supreme Court will decide an issue regarding what constitutes a "mistake" for purposes of adding a defendant to a lawsuit after the statute of limitations has run.  In some cases in which a defendant is not included in a case before the statute of limitations runs, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) permits adding that defendant.  In such cases, the defendant  must have had such sufficient notice of the suit that it would not be prejudiced in defending the case, and the failure to include the defendant must have been because of a "mistake concerning the proper party's identity."

       In Krupski, the Court will examine whether, under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), a "mistake concerning the proper party's identity"  includes a mistaken naming of a related corporate entity with a similar name when both entities' names were available to the plaintiff and her attorney before the lawsuit was filed.  In the case, the plaintiff had a boat ticket that included the names of both entities and had also turned that ticket over to her attorney before her attorney filed the complaint.  The Eleventh Circuit held that, on the facts of the case, the plaintiff had "imputed knowledge" of the proper entity and, thus, there was no "mistake concerning the proper party's identity" for purposes of the Rule. 

        Though a seemingly prosaic issue, the breadth of the term "mistake" for purposes of amending a complaint (or other pleading) after the statute of limitations has run, has split the circuits and has real world implications for plaintiffs who can lose substantive claims if an incorrect party is named in the lawsuit. 

        In a second case, Monsanto Co., et al. v. Geertson Seed Farms, et al., the Supreme Court will hear a number of issues relating to permanent injunctions, which are final remedies entered by a court that order a party to take action or to refrain from certain action.  In taking this case, the Court continues its emphasis on the standard for a trial court to enter an injunction.  The Court has dealt often with the appropriate standard in its recent cases, seeking to clarify the standard for a permanent injunction and for a preliminary injunction.  In its most recent decision on the standard for preliminary injunctions, Winter v. NRDC, the Court held that such injunctions may not issue upon a finding of "a possibility" of irreparable harm.  Instead, a plaintiff must establish that it "is likely" that it will be irreparably harmed to obtain a preliminary injunction. 

      The Geertson Seed Farms case will also center on how "likely" irreparable harm must be for a plaintiff to obtain an injunction.   The questions presented in Geertson Seed Farms are as follows:  (1) Whether plaintiffs under the National Environmental Policy Act are specially exempt from the requirement of showing a likelihood of irreparable harm to obtain an injunction; (2) whether a district court may enter an injunction sought to remedy a NEPA violation without conducting an evidentiary hearing sought by a party to resolve genuinely disputed facts directly relevant to the appropriate scope of the requested injunction; and (3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it affirmed a nationwide injunction that sought to remedy a NEPA violation based on only a remote possibility of reparable harm.  See SCOTUS Blog. 

       The decision in the case will, of course, be important for cases brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  In the typical case, a decision on a remedy available in one area of the law, such as NEPA, may have important consequences for decisions in other areas of the law.  The Court should, however, in deciding Geertson Seed Farms, consider whether the standard for an injunction under NEPA may differ from the standard for an injunction entered in other substantive areas of the law.

     This term in the case of United States v. Stevens the Supreme Court will decide whether or not Congress has the power to enact a law prohibiting the production and sale of commercial videos depicting cruelty to animals.  The case presents a number of difficult problems under the First Amendment.  One of the issues that is directly presented by this case is whether the government has a compelling reason to prevent people from viewing images of acts of animal cruelty.  An even larger issue, in my opinion, is whether "obscenity" will remain limited to depictions of sexual conduct, or whether the Court will change the meaning of the term to include graphic images of gratuitous violence.  In this initial posting, however, I discuss a narrow, technical question – the difference between challenging a law "on its face" and challenging it "as applied" to the defendant.

     In 1999 Congress enacted and the President signed a statute entitled "Depiction of Animal Cruelty," codified at 18 U.S.C. 48, making it a crime to create, sell, or possess any video or audio recording of animal cruelty for the purpose of selling that recording for commercial gain.  Here is the entire text of the statute:

(a) Creation, Sale, or Possession.— Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

(b) Exception.— Subsection (a) does not apply to any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.

(c) Definitions.— In this section—

(1) the term “depiction of animal cruelty” means any visual or auditory depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place in the State; and

(2) the term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

     Notice that it does not matter where the act of animal cruelty occurred – what matters is where the creation, sale, or possession of the recording occurs.  It is unlawful to create, sell, or possess one of these recordings if the act of animal cruelty it depicts is unlawful in the place where the creation, sale, or act occurred.  Furthermore, the law does not apply to material that has "serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value." 

     According to a posting by Adam Ezra Schulman of the First Amendment Center, the legislative history of the bill indicates that the law was directed at a very narrow problem – the appearance of "crush videos" on the internet, in which women in high-heeled shoes would torture and kill baby rats, mice, and kittens by stepping on them.  When President Clinton signed the bill, he stated that "the Act would prohibit the types of depictions, described in the statute’s legislative history, of wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex."  However, the law was not written in a limited fashion.  By its terms it applies to all depictions of animal cruelty, not simply those acts that are performed in a sexually-charged atmosphere.

     Since this law was enacted "crush videos" have disappeared, but animal cruelty has not.  In particular, there is still a large underground market for dogfighting.  Dogfighting is illegal in every state of the union, but some people enjoy breeding and training dogs for these events, others enjoy gambling on them, and still others like to watch.

     Robert J. Stevens of Virginia caters to the tastes of the third category of dogfighting fans – the onlookers.  Although Stevens does not organize or participate in dogfighting events, he collects video recordings of them, edits them, adds commentary, and sells these recordings.  After selling three videos to undercover officers he was arrested and tried in federal curt for violating 18 U.S.C. 48.  Experts for the defense claimed that Stevens'  videos had serious educational or political value, but the jury disagreed and found him guilty.  

     Stevens won on appeal.  By a vote of 10-3, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the law was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and it reversed Stevens' conviction.  Here is a link to a pdf file containing the majority and dissenting opinions of the Court of Appeals. The majority opinion is set forth on pages 1-41 of the document, and the dissent is on pages 42-79.  The United States has appealed the decision of the Third Circuit to the Supreme Court.  

     Stevens persuaded the Court of Appeals that this law, on its face, violates the First Amendment.  Accordingly, according to the brief of the United States, the question presented to the Supreme Court is "whether 18 U.S.C. 48 is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution.

     It is important to recognize that there is a difference between challenging a law "on its face" and "as applied."  In this initial posting on the Stevens case I expain the difference between challenging a law "on its face" and challenging it "as applied."

     When a defendant challenges a law "as applied" the defendant is claiming that he or she has a constitutional right to engage in the behavior in question, and that while the law may be constitutional in other circumstances, as applied to the defendant himself or herself the law is unconstitutional.  The law may be unconstitutional as applied to the defendant for one of two reasons.  The law may be "vague" as applied to the defendant – for example, Stevens could argue that it is impossible for the average person to determine whether or not dogfighting constitutes cruelty to animals.   Or the defendant may claim that the law is "overbroad" as applied to him.  In this case that would mean that Stevens would claim that he has a constitutional right to produce dogfighting videos.

     To challenge a law on its face is to assert that other people's constitutional rights would be affected by this law, and that is the argument that Stevens is making in this case.  Stevens argues that even if dogfighting videos are not protected by the First Amendment, movies about hunting or programs about bullfighting are constitutionally protected, and because the federal statute might be the interpreted to prosecute people who creae or sell those videos, the law is unconstitutional.

     To succeed in a facial challenge to a law the defendant must prove that there are relatively few circumstances where the law could be constitutionally applied.  To be unconstitutional on its face, a law must be "substantially overbroad" – that is, most of the possible applications of the law would be improper because they would be interfering with people's freedom of expression.  Notice that even someone whose conduct is not protected by the First Amendment may challenge a law on its face. 

     In effect, Stevens is saying, "Even if my commercial videos showing episodes of dogfighting are not constitutionally protected, the federal law used to prosecute me is unconstitutional because as applied to many other persons in other circumstances it would be vague or overbroad."

     Here are links to the ABA Preview report of this case, which is an outstanding article authored by Thomas Baker; Adam Schulman's summary of the legislative history for the First Amendment Center; and a summary of the case from Oyez's "On the Docket."  In subsequent postings I will discuss the merits of the defendant Stevens' First Amendment facial challenge to this law.

Visit Professor Huhn's website on Constitutional Law for information and links to sources – both timely and historical – on constitutional law.

      United States v. Stevens, the animal cruelty video case, was argued before the Supreme Court on October 6.  The transcript makes for a fascinating read, both from a forensic as well as a substantive perspective.

     Here is a link to the official transcript of oral argument in the case of United States v. Stevens.

     It was a "hot bench" – the justices posed a blizzard of questions, mostly hypotheticals about what kinds of images the government may and may not ban under the First Amendment.  They asked about hunting shows, bullfighting events, movies showing dogfighting, crush videos, and programs showing animals being processed for food.  They asked about photographs depicting women being raped and tortured and a cable channel devoted to showing human sacrifice.

     The antagonists were Neal K. Katyal, Deputy Soliciter General for the United States, and Patricia A. Millett, a Washington attorney.  Both attorneys did an outstanding job, despite their mutual inability to always respond swiftly to the judges' rapid-fire questions.  First up was Mr. Katyal, and here is an exchange he had with Chief Justice Roberts:

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What would you — if you could do it in one sentence, what is your test for determining which categories of speech are unprotected by the First Amendment?

MR. KATYAL: In one sentence, if — if — if Congress sees a compelling interest in regulating the means of production and does not target the underlying content, they can — they can regulate a depiction, so long as it leaves alternative mechanisms for that expression in — in place, and that is I think what Ferber -

     With the benefit of hindsight, all the time in the world, and the safe position of the armchair quarterback, I suggest that Mr. Katyal might better have responded:

"Unprotected categories of speech represent those situations in which the speech causes harm directly to another person (defamation or threats), or where serious harm is both likely and imminent if the speech is allowed (incitement to riot and fighting words), or where the speech consists of the depiction of a crime, and by creating a market for these depictions the commercial sale of the speech will have the effect of making the crime more likely to occur (child pornography).  This law, Mr. Chief Justice, outlaws recordings that fall within the third kind of unprotected speech." 

Nothing like second guessing, is there?

     Attorney Millett attempted to avoid answering when Justice Alito asked her whether Congress may make it illegal to create or sell "crush videos" showing women in high heels stomping small animals to death.  Ms. Millett said:

I think — I think there's a — that a properly drawn law could very well, at least in my humble opinion, this Court would have to decide, survive strict scrutiny.

There is also, I suppose, some argument whether it would fit into — you wouldn't need strict scrutiny, you would fit it into an unprotected category of speech like obscenity or it would be the production issue that would — like you have in Ferber.

JUSTICE ALITO: You are not — you are not even willing to say that that could be prohibited?

MS. MILLETT: No, no. I think — I'm saying that there are three alternative ways in which to get to it. My first if one is that not this statute, but under a properly drawn statute -

JUSTICE ALITO: Under a properly drawn statute -

MS. MILLETT: — that might survive scrutiny. I'm not sure you would -

JUSTICE ALITO: Might. I would really like you to tell me whether it would; whether you are willing to concede. Because we are trying to determine whether this is overly broad. And this is the category of activity that Congress particularly targeted. So to me at least it's important to know whether at least as applied to what Congress principally had in mind, the statute could — could pass constitutional muster. If it were, you know, as applied.

MS. MILLETT: I don't — I don't want to, say this statute, because I don't think this statute -but if the statute said, this — I think this Court disagree — it disagrees with me sometimes — but I think this could pass constitutional muster. A statute that says the patently offensive intentional torture and killing of an animal for — designed to appeal to the prurient interest for the purpose of producing the image, I think that would satisfy — I think it would satisfy strict scrutiny. The Court might also decide that it's close enough to obscenity or it's like the Ferber production rationale. That's my position; there are sort of three ways it could be analyzed, a statute like that.

That's not this statute and I don't think we can say that this statute, because Congress has the authority to reach something, that when it throws a blanket net as wide as this one has that this means this statute is the mechanism, a lawful mechanism for getting … [Here Justice Kennedy interrupted her to ask another question.]

     Again, having time to think about it, a more concise and powerful answer to Justice Alito's question would have been to say:

Yes.

     Or,

Yes, your honor, a statute narrowly drawn to prohibit the recording of actual torture or killing of animals for perverse sexual gratification would be constitutional.  Unfortunately, the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. 48, is not narrowly tailored, but instead encompasses depictions of all forms of cruelty to animals.

     Because the defendant Stevens is attacking this law "on its face" (see Part 1 of this series on United States v. Stevens), the bulk of the judges' questions and the majority of the participants' discussion related to what other acts of cruelty to animals this law might be applied to.  Justice Sotomayor asked whether the law could be applied to shows about hunting.  (Page 4)  Justice Scalia asked about programs on bullfighting (pages 10-11).  Justice Breyer added:

"sheep hunting, bear hunting, deer hunting, fox hunting, humane slaughter, and for, I think somewhere I found, the stuffing geese for pate de fois gras."  (Page 13)

     Justice Breyer then added quail hunting to the list (page 13), and Justice Ginsburg contributed cockfighting.  (Page 15).  Justice Stevens asked about hunting with a bow and arrow out of season.  (Page 16)  The answer to each of these questions is to say that the depiction could be banned only if what was being shown met three criteria: (1) the act being depicted constituted cruelty to animals; (2) the act is illegal in the jurisdiction where the recording was created, sold, or possessed; and (3) the recording has no serious political, educational, or scientific value.  Normal hunting shows do not meet any of these criteria, let alone all three. 

     Justice Ginsburg then mercifully tried to put this line of questioning out of its misery, stating:

Have we finished with the category of fights?  (Page 16)

     The discussion then turned to an even more serious subject – depictions of torture and slaughter of human beings.  Justice Sotomayor asked about the case of American Booksellers v. Hudnut (1985) (summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1986), in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional a municipal ordinance that attempted to outlaw images of women being degraded or tortured.  (Page 6-7)  Justice Scalia asked about the constitutional status of the slasher movies that appear every Halloween.  (Page 22)  Justice Alito inquired about the legality of videos of gladitorial constests.  (Page 23)  Justice Alito asked about depictions of human sacrifices:

what about people who –who like to see human sacrifices? Suppose that is legally taking place someplace in the world. I mean, people here would probably love to see it. Live, pay per view, you know, on the human sacrifice channel.  (Page 46).

Justice Scalia asked about a new Adolph Hitler, and the extermination of whole populations.  (Page 47)  Other justices raised questions about "snuff videos" and "the ethnic cleansing channel."  (Page 48).  Quite clearly the Court is wondering whether some depictions of violence against human beings may be prohibited … in effect, whether violence should be considered to be a form of obscenity.  Chief Justice Roberts wanted Ms. Millett to answer this question:

JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm still looking for your answer to Justice Alito's hypotheticals. Can Congress ban the human sacrifice channel or not?

MS. MILLETT: I — the — I think — I — I will start by saying — no. Let's start and see. Maybe — maybe it won't work, but I think -

     Attorney Millett's initial response accurately reflects the ambivalence of the American people and the law towards depictions of violence.  The fact of the matter is that as a society we haven't been willing to answer that question.  We have made the explicit sex act taboo, but graphic scenes of torture, mutilation, and murder are simply routine "entertainment."  Towards the end of her argument, Millett ably contends that laws prohibiting depictions of violence which are enacted, not because Congress is attempting to stamp out the activity in question, but merely because society finds the images repulsive, violate the First Amendment.  (Pages 54-55).  On rebuttal, Attorney Katyal agreed.  (Page 57)

     This case broaches the question of depictions of gratuitious violence in an indirect manner.  With a focus on cruelty to animals rather than cruelty to other people, United States v. Stevens challenges us to come up with good reasons to allow people to make money from the actual suffering of other creatures.  It is a discussion that is long overdue.

Visit Professor Huhn's website on Constitutional Law for information and links to sources – both timely and historical – on constitutional law.

     Here are some extended quotes from Dr. King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," links to several other of Dr. King's greatest speeches, and a link to President Barack Obama's speech yesterday in remembrance of Dr. King.

     On April 16, 1963, King released his "Letter from a Birmingham Jail."  First, King explains why he has come to Alabama, and why he should not be considered an "outsider:"

I think I should indicate why I am here in Birmingham, since you have been influenced by the view which argues against "outsiders coming in." I have the honor of serving as president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization operating in every southern state, with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. We have some eighty five affiliated organizations across the South, and one of them is the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights. Frequently we share staff, educational and financial resources with our affiliates. Several months ago the affiliate here in Birmingham asked us to be on call to engage in a nonviolent direct action program if such were deemed necessary. We readily consented, and when the hour came we lived up to our promise. So I, along with several members of my staff, am here because I was invited here. I am here because I have organizational ties here.

But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their "thus saith the Lord" far beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own home town. Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid.

Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial "outside agitator" idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds.

     Next, King explains his philosophy of non-violent civil disobedience and expresses his determination to implement that philosophy in the City of Birmingham. 

In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action. We have gone through all these steps in Birmingham. There can be no gainsaying the fact that racial injustice engulfs this community. Birmingham is probably the most thoroughly segregated city in the United States. Its ugly record of brutality is widely known. Negroes have experienced grossly unjust treatment in the courts. There have been more unsolved bombings of Negro homes and churches in Birmingham than in any other city in the nation. These are the hard, brutal facts of the case. On the basis of these conditions, Negro leaders sought to negotiate with the city fathers. But the latter consistently refused to engage in good faith negotiation.

Then, last September, came the opportunity to talk with leaders of Birmingham's economic community. In the course of the negotiations, certain promises were made by the merchants–for example, to remove the stores' humiliating racial signs. On the basis of these promises, the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth and the leaders of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights agreed to a moratorium on all demonstrations. As the weeks and months went by, we realized that we were the victims of a broken promise. A few signs, briefly removed, returned; the others remained. As in so many past experiences, our hopes had been blasted, and the shadow of deep disappointment settled upon us. We had no alternative except to prepare for direct action, whereby we would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the conscience of the local and the national community. Mindful of the difficulties involved, we decided to undertake a process of self purification. We began a series of workshops on nonviolence, and we repeatedly asked ourselves: "Are you able to accept blows without retaliating?" "Are you able to endure the ordeal of jail?" We decided to schedule our direct action program for the Easter season, realizing that except for Christmas, this is the main shopping period of the year. Knowing that a strong economic-withdrawal program would be the by product of direct action, we felt that this would be the best time to bring pressure to bear on the merchants for the needed change.

Then it occurred to us that Birmingham's mayoral election was coming up in March, and we speedily decided to postpone action until after election day. When we discovered that the Commissioner of Public Safety, Eugene "Bull" Connor, had piled up enough votes to be in the run off, we decided again to postpone action until the day after the run off so that the demonstrations could not be used to cloud the issues. Like many others, we waited to see Mr. Connor defeated, and to this end we endured postponement after postponement. Having aided in this community need, we felt that our direct action program could be delayed no longer.

You may well ask: "Why direct action? Why sit ins, marches and so forth? Isn't negotiation a better path?" You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word "tension." I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. The purpose of our direct action program is to create a situation so crisis packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation. I therefore concur with you in your call for negotiation. Too long has our beloved Southland been bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than dialogue.

One of the basic points in your statement is that the action that I and my associates have taken in Birmingham is untimely. Some have asked: "Why didn't you give the new city administration time to act?" The only answer that I can give to this query is that the new Birmingham administration must be prodded about as much as the outgoing one, before it will act. We are sadly mistaken if we feel that the election of Albert Boutwell as mayor will bring the millennium to Birmingham. While Mr. Boutwell is a much more gentle person than Mr. Connor, they are both segregationists, dedicated to maintenance of the status quo. I have hope that Mr. Boutwell will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to desegregation. But he will not see this without pressure from devotees of civil rights. My friends, I must say to you that we have not made a single gain in civil rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure. Lamentably, it is an historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but, as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups tend to be more immoral than individuals.

We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct action campaign that was "well timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant "Never." We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied."

We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining political independence, but we still creep at horse and buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, "Wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six year old daughter why she can't go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white people; when you have to concoct an answer for a five year old son who is asking: "Daddy, why do white people treat colored people so mean?"; when you take a cross county drive and find it necessary to sleep night after night in the uncomfortable corners of your automobile because no motel will accept you; when you are humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs reading "white" and "colored"; when your first name becomes "nigger," your middle name becomes "boy" (however old you are) and your last name becomes "John," and your wife and mother are never given the respected title "Mrs."; when you are harried by day and haunted by night by the fact that you are a Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never quite knowing what to expect next, and are plagued with inner fears and outer resentments; when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodiness"–then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait. There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair. I hope, sirs, you can understand our legitimate and unavoidable impatience. You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws. This is certainly a legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme Court's decision of 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, at first glance it may seem rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws. One may well ask: "How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all."

     King expanded upon his understanding of the difference between just and unjust laws:

Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I it" relationship for an "I thou" relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful. Paul Tillich has said that sin is separation. Is not segregation an existential expression of man's tragic separation, his awful estrangement, his terrible sinfulness? Thus it is that I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for it is morally right; and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordinances, for they are morally wrong.

Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up that state's segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some counties in which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the population, not a single Negro is registered. Can any law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured?

Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its application. For instance, I have been arrested on a charge of parading without a permit. Now, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance which requires a permit for a parade. But such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens the First-Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and protest.

I hope you are able to see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law, as would the rabid segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.

Of course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil disobedience. It was evidenced sublimely in the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of Nebuchadnezzar, on the ground that a higher moral law was at stake. It was practiced superbly by the early Christians, who were willing to face hungry lions and the excruciating pain of chopping blocks rather than submit to certain unjust laws of the Roman Empire. To a degree, academic freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience. In our own nation, the Boston Tea Party represented a massive act of civil disobedience.

We should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was "legal" and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was "illegal." It was "illegal" to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler's Germany. Even so, I am sure that, had I lived in Germany at the time, I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers. If today I lived in a Communist country where certain principles dear to the Christian faith are suppressed, I would openly advocate disobeying that country's antireligious laws.

     King then expressed two disappointments – disappointment with white moderates and disappointment with the church.  To the moderates, he said:

I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.

I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured.

In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity.

     And to the southern churches, he said:

…  I must honestly reiterate that I have been disappointed with the church. I do not say this as one of those negative critics who can always find something wrong with the church. I say this as a minister of the gospel, who loves the church; who was nurtured in its bosom; who has been sustained by its spiritual blessings and who will remain true to it as long as the cord of life shall lengthen.

When I was suddenly catapulted into the leadership of the bus protest in Montgomery, Alabama, a few years ago, I felt we would be supported by the white church. I felt that the white ministers, priests and rabbis of the South would be among our strongest allies. Instead, some have been outright opponents, refusing to understand the freedom movement and misrepresenting its leaders; all too many others have been more cautious than courageous and have remained silent behind the anesthetizing security of stained glass windows.

In spite of my shattered dreams, I came to Birmingham with the hope that the white religious leadership of this community would see the justice of our cause and, with deep moral concern, would serve as the channel through which our just grievances could reach the power structure. I had hoped that each of you would understand. But again I have been disappointed.

I have heard numerous southern religious leaders admonish their worshipers to comply with a desegregation decision because it is the law, but I have longed to hear white ministers declare: "Follow this decree because integration is morally right and because the Negro is your brother." In the midst of blatant injustices inflicted upon the Negro, I have watched white churchmen stand on the sideline and mouth pious irrelevancies and sanctimonious trivialities. In the midst of a mighty struggle to rid our nation of racial and economic injustice, I have heard many ministers say: "Those are social issues, with which the gospel has no real concern." And I have watched many churches commit themselves to a completely other worldly religion which makes a strange, un-Biblical distinction between body and soul, between the sacred and the secular.

I have traveled the length and breadth of Alabama, Mississippi and all the other southern states. On sweltering summer days and crisp autumn mornings I have looked at the South's beautiful churches with their lofty spires pointing heavenward. I have beheld the impressive outlines of her massive religious education buildings. Over and over I have found myself asking: "What kind of people worship here? Who is their God? Where were their voices when the lips of Governor Barnett dripped with words of interposition and nullification? Where were they when Governor Wallace gave a clarion call for defiance and hatred? Where were their voices of support when bruised and weary Negro men and women decided to rise from the dark dungeons of complacency to the bright hills of creative protest?"

Yes, these questions are still in my mind. In deep disappointment I have wept over the laxity of the church. But be assured that my tears have been tears of love. There can be no deep disappointment where there is not deep love. Yes, I love the church. How could I do otherwise? I am in the rather unique position of being the son, the grandson and the great grandson of preachers. Yes, I see the church as the body of Christ. But, oh! How we have blemished and scarred that body through social neglect and through fear of being nonconformists.

     King closed with these words:

Never before have I written so long a letter. I'm afraid it is much too long to take your precious time. I can assure you that it would have been much shorter if I had been writing from a comfortable desk, but what else can one do when he is alone in a narrow jail cell, other than write long letters, think long thoughts and pray long prayers?

If I have said anything in this letter that overstates the truth and indicates an unreasonable impatience, I beg you to forgive me. If I have said anything that understates the truth and indicates my having a patience that allows me to settle for anything less than brotherhood, I beg God to forgive me.

I hope this letter finds you strong in the faith. I also hope that circumstances will soon make it possible for me to meet each of you, not as an integrationist or a civil-rights leader but as a fellow clergyman and a Christian brother. Let us all hope that the dark clouds of racial prejudice will soon pass away and the deep fog of misunderstanding will be lifted from our fear drenched communities, and in some not too distant tomorrow the radiant stars of love and brotherhood will shine over our great nation with all their scintillating beauty.

     The website writespirit.net has stored a number of Dr. King's other speeches, including the Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, I Have A Dream, Where Do We Go From Here, Loving Your Enemies, Our God Is Marching On, Lincoln Memorial Address, and Beyond Vietnam. 

     Yesterday, in a speech at Vermont Avenue Baptist Church in Washington, D.C., President Barack Obama recalled that as a 27-year-old preacher, Dr. King had delivered a sermon at that same church on December 6, 1956, entitled "The Challenge of a New Age."   The President said:

On Thursday, December 6, 1956. And before Dr. King had pointed us to the mountaintop, before he told us about his dream in front of the Lincoln Memorial, King came here, as a 27-year-old preacher, to speak on what he called "The Challenge of a New Age." "The Challenge of a New Age." It was a period of triumph, but also uncertainty, for Dr. King and his followers — because just weeks earlier, the Supreme Court had ordered the desegregation of Montgomery's buses, a hard-wrought, hard-fought victory that would put an end to the 381-day historic boycott down in Montgomery, Alabama.

And yet, as Dr. King rose to take that pulpit, the future still seemed daunting. It wasn't clear what would come next for the movement that Dr. King led. It wasn't clear how we were going to reach the Promised Land. Because segregation was still rife; lynchings still a fact. Yes, the Supreme Court had ruled not only on the Montgomery buses, but also on Brown v. Board of Education. And yet that ruling was defied throughout the South — by schools and by states; they ignored it with impunity. And here in the nation's capital, the federal government had yet to fully align itself with the laws on its books and the ideals of its founding.

So it's not hard for us, then, to imagine that moment. We can imagine folks coming to this church, happy about the boycott being over. We can also imagine them, though, coming here concerned about their future, sometimes second-guessing strategy, maybe fighting off some creeping doubts, perhaps despairing about whether the movement in which they had placed so many of their hopes — a movement in which they believed so deeply — could actually deliver on its promise.

So here we are, more than half a century later, once again facing the challenges of a new age. Here we are, once more marching toward an unknown future, what I call the Joshua generation to their Moses generation — the great inheritors of progress paid for with sweat and blood, and sometimes life itself.

     The President referred to the leaders and participants of the civil rights movement as "the Moses generation" and to the people of the present-day as "the Joshua generation," and compared the challenges we face to the challenges of that time:

Unemployment is at its highest level in more than a quarter of a century. Nowhere is it higher than the African American community. Poverty is on the rise. Home ownership is slipping. Beyond our shores, our sons and daughters are fighting two wars. Closer to home, our Haitian brothers and sisters are in desperate need. Bruised, battered, many people are legitimately feeling doubt, even despair, about the future. Like those who came to this church on that Thursday in 1956, folks are wondering, where do we go from here?

I understand those feelings. I understand the frustration and sometimes anger that so many folks feel as they struggle to stay afloat. I get letters from folks around the country every day; I read 10 a night out of the 40,000 that we receive. And there are stories of hardship and desperation, in some cases, pleading for help: I need a job. I'm about to lose my home. I don't have health care — it's about to cause my family to be bankrupt. Sometimes you get letters from children: My mama or my daddy have lost their jobs, is there something you can do to help? Ten letters like that a day we read.

So, yes, we're passing through a hard winter. It's the hardest in some time. But let's always remember that, as a people, the American people, we've weathered some hard winters before. This country was founded during some harsh winters. The fishermen, the laborers, the craftsmen who made camp at Valley Forge — they weathered a hard winter. The slaves and the freedmen who rode an underground railroad, seeking the light of justice under the cover of night — they weathered a hard winter. The seamstress whose feet were tired, the pastor whose voice echoes through the ages — they weathered some hard winters. It was for them, as it is for us, difficult, in the dead of winter, to sometimes see spring coming. They, too, sometimes felt their hopes deflate. And yet, each season, the frost melts, the cold recedes, the sun reappears. So it was for earlier generations and so it will be for us.

What we need to do is to just ask what lessons we can learn from those earlier generations about how they sustained themselves during those hard winters, how they persevered and prevailed. Let us in this Joshua generation learn how that Moses generation overcame.

     Dr. King was an extraordinary man, an American hero.  One of the most remarkable facts about his life, and perhaps the most difficult to accept, is that he was taken from us at the age of only 39.  Had he lived he would be only 82 years old today.  How different would our country be – how different would we be – if we had had the advantage of his guidance and leadership for the past 42 years?

I think so.  More here.

Who wouldn’t like Supreme Court issues explained in easy to understand terminology?  The Supreme Court of the United States Blog (SCOTUSBLOG) is now publishing plain English summaries of the Questions Presented in each of the Supreme Court cases for this Term.   

Below, the blog has set out the questions for cases through April 2010, divided according to subject matter.  The cases are listed with their Plain English issue.

• The Criminal Law Docket in Plain English
• The Civil Constitutional and Civil Rights Docket in Plain English
• The Rest of the Civil Docket in Plain English

For definitions of legal terms used in the cases, look them up in the Glossary of Supreme Court terms which is also available on the SCOTUS blog site. 

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SCOTUS Wiki   

This wiki is a great one-stop site for information about the latest Supreme Court cases.  A typical listing includes links to the briefs filed in the case, oral argument analysis, transcripts of the oral arguments (as they are available), the decision, background about the case and links to articles, blog postings and law review articles.  I am inserting the Plain English description of the questions presented in the cases.

Upcoming cases in January listed on the wiki:

Tues., Jan. 19:

1. Mac’s Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Company; Shell Oil Products Company v. Mac’s Shell Service (08-240; 08-372) — the rights of service station operators to sue to challenge the loss, or non-renewal of their franchises from oil companies.  Plain English- Federal law regulates when an oil company can terminate gas station franchises.  The question presented is: can a station sue only if the oil company has formally “terminated” it, rather than for less severe action that would be a “constructive termination.”
2. Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (08-1214) — federal court’s jurisdiction to determine collective bargaining agreement formation.  Plain English- In this case, the employer wants to sue over a collective bargaining agreement signed by a local union rather than its international.  The questions are, under federal labor law, whether (1) a federal court or instead an arbitrator should decide whether there is an actual agreement, and (2) the employer should sue the international or instead the local.

Wed., Jan. 20:

1. Berghuis v. Smith (08-1402) — the proper test to assess the fairness of community representation on a jury.  Plain English-  The case presents two issues.  First, what test should be used to decide whether the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community has been violated?  Second, assuming that the state courts in this case applied the wrong test, did they violate “clearly established federal law,” which is required to overturn the defendant’s conviction?
2. Conkright v. Frommert (08-810) — the proper standard of review for an ERISA denial-of-benefits case.  Plain English-  An employee health plan often has an administrator who must interpret its terms, and in some circumstances courts will defer to the administrator’s reading.  The question is whether a court should defer not only to interpretations that administrators adopt when deciding claims for benefits but also interpretations they adopt when litigating a lawsuit in court.

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More Plain English – The life of a case at the Supreme Court

To help illustrate the terms and concepts you will often encounter in discussions of the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG has written an imaginary Supreme Court case.  The sample case explains terminology used and every step of the Supreme Court process.

     Here are some useful links to keep you up to date on the Prop 8 trial.

1.  A summary of the procedural aspects of the trial from my Constitutional Law website;

2.  Plaintiffs' trial brief;

3.  Defendants' trial brief;

4.  Alliance Defense Fund website, with daily updates on the trial from the standpoint of supporters of Prop 8;

5.  lgbt pov website on the trial, with daily updates from the standpoint of opponents of Prop 8.

     In addition, here are links to a Newsweek article by Eve Conant on the collaboration of Ted Olson and David Boies as attorneys for the plaintiffs; a speech by Jenny Pizer of Lamda Legal's National Marriage Project; Ted Olson's Newsweek article "The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage;" and a posting by Amy Ridenour of the National Center for Public Policy Research rebutting Olson. 

Visit Professor Huhn's website on Constitutional Law for information and links to sources – both timely and historical – on constitutional law.